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Targeting “Lifestyle” Conditions.  
What Justifications for Treatment? 
Philippe Batifoulier, Louise Braddock, Victor Duchesne,  
Ariane Ghirardello & John Latsis  
Abstract: »Das Targeting von „Lifestyle“-Bedingungen. Welche Rechtfertigun-
gen für die Behandlung?«. Patients suffering from “lifestyle” conditions are 
most often viewed as responsible for their illness, and so not considered to 
be a priority for healthcare resources. Instead, their treatment is financed on 
instrumental grounds: it is better to treat the condition now than to incur 
higher costs later of not doing so. An alternative register of justification at 
work in public healthcare policies is not motivated by instrumental consid-
erations. Instead, it seeks to articulate an ethical case for prioritizing life-
style conditions. Within this framework, we draw on the notion of vital need 
within the tradition of humanistic philosophy to argue that solidarity justi-
fies the treatment of such conditions, exemplified here by obesity. We use 
the theoretical framework of economics of convention to present these two 
registers of justification at work in public healthcare policies. The im-
portance of humanistic criticism prevents instrumental logic from being 
completely dominant. 
Keywords: Economics of convention, orders of worth, obesity, health poli-
cy, vital need, targeting. 
1. Introduction 
In this article, we provide a normative justification for treating lifestyle 
conditions. These are medical conditions where issues of individual respon-
sibility are cited as contributory and may be used in the justification of 
treatment decisions. There is a considerable financial burden associated 
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with treating these conditions, which arises in a number of different ways. 
First, the problem (e.g., obesity or tobacco use) is constructed as an illness; 
here the role of the medical profession is important – if the condition is an 
illness it should be treated (Cookson and Dolan 2000; Korica and Molloy 
2010). Second, there is a contribution from industry: for example, the food 
industry wishing to protect the “fat-business,” or the pharmaceutical indus-
try preferring profitable chronic illnesses that require treatment to less 
profitable prevention strategies (Goryakin et al. 2015). Third, there is the 
instrumental economic argument that it will cost less to treat the condition 
now than in the future (Dobbs et al. 2014).1 
All these are negative reasons for treating lifestyle conditions and lack any 
apparent ethical basis. This goes some way to explaining why different 
countries have different tariffs for lifestyle conditions and why such condi-
tions are seen as suspect and sufferers are often stigmatized. Moreover, in 
the instrumental argument, patients are segregated: the security of the 
healthy counts for more than that of the safety of the sick. 
This instrumental conception is criticized for its “anti-humanism.” Priori-
tizing treatment of lifestyle conditions should be based on a “rule of rescue” 
(McKie and Richardson 2003). This justifies prioritization and replaces social 
separation with social connectedness.  
The aim of this article is to analyze the justification of health policies, and 
particularly the financing of expenditures, within the framework of the 
economics of convention (EC). From this perspective, we consider that 
priority setting in healthcare is permeated by two competing conventions: 
an instrumental convention and a humanistic convention. Here, conven-
tions are understood as a set of shared beliefs, inscribed in institutions, 
bound up with actions, and hence anchored in reality (Boltanski and Chia-
pello 2005). Conventions provide a basis for priority setting as well as for 
comparative criticism of competing conventions. Each convention conveys 
its own understanding of the common good2, which is reflected in the re-
sources it provides for justification, denunciation, and critiques (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006; Diaz-Bone and Salais 2011).  
In this article, we first propose a conventionalist approach developing an 
alternative theory which attempts to challenge the incapacity of mainstream 
economics to deal with values (Batifoulier, Domin, and Gadreau 2011; Bati-
foulier, Braddock, and Latsis 2013; McMaster, Batifoulier, and Domin 2015; 
Batifoulier, Da Silva, and Duchesne 2019). We also draw inspiration from 
the Welfare Conventions Approach designed for understanding the “gov-
ernmentality” of welfare and the processes of “welfare apparatuses” (Rose 
 
1  Though this ignores the contribution of healthcare expenditure to GDP and hence economic 
growth. 
2  We discuss in the text the status of the common good incorporated in each convention. 
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and Miller 1992). We view health policies as moral disputes and assume that 
priority setting in healthcare emanates from disputes and com-promises 
between “orders of worth” (Chiapello and Knoll 2020). 
In conventionalist analysis, the process of justification is based on the 
model of “orders of worth.” The “worth” (cité) model of Boltanski and Thé-
venot (2006) provides an analytical framework which enumerates the shared 
higher principles on which individuals’ justifications are based.  
We also ground our argument in an ontological claim about human be-
ings’ susceptibility to harm, where harm is understood as the impairment of 
those powers necessary for full human agency. Citizens look to just ar-
rangements to protect themselves against the harm arising from circum-
stances beyond individual human control. The resources for protection, or 
failing that of mitigation of harm, are a good to which all human beings in a 
given community need to access in order to live with dignity in that com-
munity. Ensuring access to this protection is a matter of social justice.  
Obesity provides a good test case, since it is a potential prime example for 
our analysis. The unequal status of obesity as a healthcare priority across 
jurisdictions indicates potential uncertainty about the normative basis for 
prioritizing treatment of the condition.  
In section 2, we present our conventionalist approach to priority setting 
after characterizing the importance of obesity as an economic problem. In 
section 3, we review the current instrumental economic justification for 
treatment and its normative limitations. We refer to two objections: the 
argument from self-control and the argument from rationality. Section 4 
presents our main argument. First, we assume that obesity is a social con-
struction in order to set out the complex interdependence of physiological, 
psychological, and social causes of obesity. Then we elaborate our concep-
tion of harm and articulate the connection between protection from harm 
and vital needs, thus providing the ethical framework of the humanistic 
convention. Finally, a critique of instrumental logic is developed both on the 
basis of humanist logic and the economies of worth to show the limits of an 
approach based on individual responsibility. 
2. Targeting “Lifestyle” Conditions: A Conceptual 
Framework 
In this section we emphasize the construction of the problem of lifestyle 
diseases (2.1). We then propose a reading of health policies in terms of mor-
al disputes by introducing the theoretical framework of EC (2.2). 
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2.1  Lifestyle Diseases as a Public Health Problem 
Lifestyle-related diseases have emerged as the new priority of Western 
health systems since the early 1990s. This evolution is the result of different 
processes that characterize the evolution of public health policies. 
The HealthBASKET program has developed an inventory of European 
health care services in order to delineate the services that are supplied by 
publicly funded health services in different member states. Comparative 
study emphasizes the similarities between states if we consider a very broad 
conception of service provision which focusses on the so-called “depth” of 
the health basket. However, it is not the case if we focus instead on the 
“height” of the basket – the proportion of the cost of goods and services 
charged to, or reimbursed by, the state or public institutions (Velasco-
Garrido et al. 2006). 
Some groups, such as children, adolescents, and pregnant women, benefit 
from prioritization policies everywhere. However, health services all over 
Europe have created, developed, or activated prioritization policies de-
signed to privilege certain patient groups by protecting them from excessive 
financial outlays. This form of targeted solidarity has intensified with the 
introduction of market reforms designed to reduce expenditure (Van de Ven 
and Wynand 1996). Though health provision has always been targeted at 
certain groups, the erosion of solidarity has forced governments to justify 
current prioritization policies and develop new ones.  
Priority setting in healthcare, in a context of budget shrinkage, began in 
the early 1990s, mainly in the United States and Great Britain, and then 
spread to other Western economies (Tenbensel 2000; Ham 1997). Their 
objective is to implement an order in which diseases should be treated by 
the health and social protection systems. Thus, a disease deemed medically 
less urgent will be treated after or be less reimbursed than a disease deemed 
urgent. This strategy makes it possible to smooth the demand for care ac-
cording to existing health and budgetary capacities. On the other hand, it 
can lead to a renunciation of care or a worsening of the state of health.  
This movement has been followed since the 2000s by the development of 
the issue of “non-communicable diseases” (NCD) or chronic non-
communicable diseases as a central priority of health policies (WHO 2013; 
Beaglehole and Yach 2003). The “NCD” label thus groups together under the 
same name a group of diseases consisting of cardiovascular diseases, chron-
ic respiratory infections, cancers, and diabetes. These diseases are present-
ed as accounting for 71% of deaths worldwide. For some of them (heart 
disease, obesity, etc.), they have been considered as factors aggravating the 
risks associated with the development of COVID 19.3 The common factor for 
 
3  https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19/information/high-risk-groups. 
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all these diseases is that they are related to lifestyle: smoking, sedentariness, 
etc. To address this, health policies resulting from the NCD crisis place most 
weight on modifying behavior.  
These two movements, taken together, have been accompanied by an in-
creased emphasis on the power of education systems and on the generaliza-
tion of the concept of health determinants, with the aim of developing 
mechanisms for mobilizing and empowering populations so that they ac-
quire the awareness and capacity to manage their health. 
All of these approaches make the management of a significant proportion 
of the diseases of the 21st century based on individual responsibility and 
empowerment. This approach tends to ignore the social roots and economic 
origins of a disease. As a result, there is considerable controversy about the 
justifications for managing these lifestyle diseases. 
2.2 Health Policies as Moral Disputes: The Theoretical Framework 
of Economics of Convention 
Though we can see all three of these criteria in operation in the prioritiza-
tion decisions taken by European countries, they are not sufficient for ex-
plaining the observed diversity in actual practice. The moral ideals underly-
ing prioritization measures are translated into policy, in particular historical 
and political contexts. Health policies reflect the political arbitrage between 
moral ideals in competition with one another. No ideal can fully impose 
itself as fundamental at the expense of the others. In Europe, there are vari-
ations in both treatment and reimbursement policies with respect to life-
style conditions (Nguyen-Kim et al. 2005), which suggests that there are 
different normative visions. Our goal in this section is to use the analytical 
framework of EC to provide a strong moral foundation for health policy 
rationales. We argue that convention theory provides a theoretical frame-
work for these competing orders of justification. 
The use of the theoretical framework of EC to analyze public health poli-
cies implemented from the 1980s makes it possible both to identify the 
overall coherence and legitimacy of these policies, and to explicitly link 
public policy mechanisms to the justifications that specifically underlie 
them. As in other fields, health policies are part of a neo-liberal shift seeking 
to develop market mechanisms and entrepreneurial logic on both the sup-
ply side (doctors) and the demand side (patients). These policies are part of 
a framework of tighter budgetary constraints, the restriction of public fi-
nancial plan, and the development of the privatization of healthcare (André, 
Batifoulier, and Jansen‐Ferreira 2016). 
In this conception, the notion of individual responsibility plays an im-
portant role. Policies that seek to make the patient pay, for example, are 
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justified by the need to develop individual responsibility and for each per-
son to manage his or her health.  
There are limits to the costs of illness and in many countries, the patient is 
more often asked to contribute to the financing of part of his or her health 
costs, both in outpatient medicine and clinics. The highly “cost sharing” 
programs are put forward by governments because they make it possible to 
internalize the social cost of the patient’s behavior, they encourage a thrifty 
attitude to health expenditure, and they make it possible to combat fraud. 
While this register of individual responsibility can be mobilized to justify 
health policies, it is not the only one. There are different registers of justifi-
cation at work in public healthcare policies. 
We assume that there is no unified vision of public health policy. As the 
EC argues, there are a small number of shared references that can be called 
conventions (Diaz-Bone and Favereau 2019). These conventions are collec-
tive representations of what a health care management policy should be.  
According to the Welfare Conventions Approach, we study welfare state 
and the “governmentality” of welfare as moral disputes (Rose and Miller 
1992). Healthcare policy is a matter of disputes that can be traced to conven-
tions. Welfare conventions are ways of framing social problems identifying 
dedicated causes and solutions (Chiapello and Knoll 2020). Priority setting in 
healthcare emanates from moral disputes. Healthcare mechanisms and 
instruments are analyzed as embodiments of specific – and historically 
diverse – forms of justice and fairness (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
There is a controversy between different ways of providing health care 
and this controversy can be informed by the notion of convention. We limit 
the controversy to a binary view of health care financing. On the one hand, 
justification can refer to ethical grounds, valuing health as a fundamental 
and unconditional good. On the other hand, funding for care can be justified 
on purely instrumental grounds. Funding is conditional on the individual’s 
respect for their own responsibility. Individuals must bear part of the cost of 
care when their behavior is a source of expenditure. This register of justifi-
cation is also a register of criticism and denounces scrounging as well as 
fraud and abuses. Individuals should not weigh on society, and health care 
financing is useful when it mitigates the costs of what would be more ex-
pensive tomorrow or when it leads to positive externalities.  
For some treatments these concepts clash. This is particularly the case for 
lifestyle-related diseases where individual responsibility is emphasized. In 
the case of smoking, alcoholism, or obesity, for example, the behavior of 
individuals is emphasized and criticized. But health policies fund the 
healthcare that can be caused by these behaviors (e.g., lung cancer, cirrho-
sis, or obesity). They do so in the name of ethical justifications and the need 
to fight the disease. They also do it in the name of economic arguments. 
These chronic diseases have a high cost to society, which has to devote an 
HSR 46 (2021) 1  │  65 
increasing proportion of (public) resources to their funding. These diseases 
generate negative externalities for people who are not ill. For example, 
passive smoking generates new healthcare costs, parental obesity affects the 
obesity of children, etc.  
We propose to compare these two registers of justification with conven-
tions, i.e., with different “orders of worth” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
Humanistic convention approximates to the “philanthropic convention” of 
Chiapello and Knoll (2020). It emphasizes the moral duty to help the most 
vulnerable. Instrumental convention is close to the “market convention” 
and aims at enabling everyone to act as an agent of the market. These two 
registers of justification are in competition. The approach of EC makes it 
possible to understand that the financial management of health care is 
based on different conventional visions. These conventions each define a 
particular form of organization of healthcare priorities. 
As in the Welfare Conventions Approach, the two registers of justification 
that we identify at work in public healthcare policies provide a normative 
representation of acceptable working of social policy (here, priority setting 
in healthcare).  
3. Instrumentality and Individual Responsibility 
In this section, we develop the instrumental argument and the foundations 
of the convention that it supports. According to this convention, in the field 
of obesity management, it is better to treat the condition now than to incur 
higher costs later of not doing so. Utilitarian arguments emphasize individ-
ual responsibility in order to counter the “obesity epidemic” that is a “finan-
cial epidemic” (3.1). The instrumental justification for treating obesity and 
the emphasis on individual responsibility combine rational choice and mor-
al considerations, which raises normative issues (3.2). 
3.1 Instrumental Justification for Treating Obesity and Individual 
Responsibility 
The idea of a “financial epidemic” fuels the instrumental economic argu-
ment. The underlying argument is that conditions such as obesity are dan-
gerous for society because they threaten the financial equilibrium of health 
insurance. The foreseeable rise in costs requires more financial resources to 
be directed to these conditions. The excess cost is borne by public expendi-
ture in Europe, and even to some extent in the USA. “One-unit increase in 
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BMI4 for every adult in the United states would increase annual public med-
ical expenditures by $6.0 billion” (MacEwan, Alston, and Okrent 2014, 696). 
Conversely, a reduction of the average BMI to below 25 would produce sub-
stantial savings.  
Expanding obesity also has an impact on the expansion of the private 
healthcare insurance market. In the United States, where the medical costs 
of obesity have largely been borne by public programs (Medicaid and Medi-
care), private insurance costs have risen (Finkelstein, Graham, and Mal-
hotra 2014). Obesity affects insurers’ profits and the actuarial calculation of 
risks. Inflating costs have brought back to prominence early, instrumentally 
motivated attempts by insurers to combat obesity in order to control ex-
penses. In 1942, it was the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a private 
insurer that provided the first definition of BMI thresholds and published 
the first “ideal” weights for men and women. 
In Europe, the high cost of chronic conditions has led to limits on alloca-
tions for other conditions in times of budgetary constraint. This is particu-
larly so in France where illnesses linked to obesity are reimbursed at 100% 
(diabetes, hypertension), whereas for everyday care the limit is set at 55%. 
Obesity treatment therefore presents a problem for the non-obese. Aside 
from the public health issue, combating obesity is a matter of budgetary 
urgency. The risk attached to the condition is not, as with ordinary epidem-
ics, a risk only for those who develop the illness; it is also a risk for those 
who do not. This purely instrumental argument makes a case for treating 
obesity in order to avoid penalizing the non-obese.  
In fact, putting the financial security of the healthy rather than the suffer-
ing of the ill in the foreground goes against the logic of solidarity. This logic 
rests on the recognition that each individual belongs to a community and 
does not divide up the world into those who pay and those who receive. The 
notion of equal dignity amongst humans, which grounds the idea of solidari-
ty, is further undermined by the perceived role of individual responsibility 
in the development of obesity. The argument from here on is well known. 
Uncontrolled eating without physical activity and “delinquent nutritional 
behavior” produce weight-gain. The wide acceptance of this narrative owes 
much to the predominance of the individualist approach which will be fur-
ther developed in section 3.2. 
Prevention of obesity in the home is often attempted through negative 
messages (about losing employment, for instance) rather than positive mes-
sages (effects on health and well-being). Healthy eating is presented as a 
means to weight loss rather than as a way to maintain good health long-
term. Preoccupations about health, both individual and collective, appear to 
 
4  The Body mass index (BMI) is a measure of body fat based on height and weight.  
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be relegated to the background by anti-fat remarks (“Don’t eat that, you’ll get 
fat!”; Thomas et al. 2014). The media accentuate this pejorative image by 
associating obese people with a range of difficulties. The “news media epi-
demiology” of obesity tends to over-represent non-whites and under-
represent the older age groups, by comparison with their statistical preva-
lence (Gollust, Eboh, and Barry 2012). 
Targeting obesity is thus justified by default, not by positive argument. Ar-
guments from solidarity do not contribute to the dominant reasoning. The 
obese are presented as different from others, and their illness is that of 
someone “other.” Obesity is not seen as a condition (illness) that may affect 
anyone. The instrumental arguments for its treatment dominate the ethical 
ones.  
The combination of health metrics (such as BMI) and financial metrics 
(budget ratios), on which instrumental health policies are designated to 
facilitate economic calculation and the allocation of scarce resources (Bati-
foulier, Latsis, and Merchiers 2009). They assume a unique type of calcula-
tive rationality that is characteristic of mainstream economics. The conven-
tionalist approach has challenged and undermined this assumption by 
showing that calculation is dependent on justificatory frameworks (orders 
of worth) that are painstakingly established through social processes of 
negotiation (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Salais 2016; Diaz-Bone 2016). 
Conventionalists claim that calculation is dependent on social actors’ shared 
ability to group objects and people into equivalence classes which draw on 
the same format of relevant information, share a form of evaluation, recog-
nize the same basic or elementary social relations, and prize similar indi-
vidual characteristics (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Without constitutive 
conventions to frame coordination, cost benefit calculations are not possi-
ble. According to this theoretical perspective any valuations of worth imply 
a definition of the common good and shared values are the basic and ines-
capable precondition of all calculative activity. 
The conjunction of an instrumental justification for treating obesity and 
the emphasis on individual responsibility may explain differences between 
public healthcare budgets. For example, France and the UK have both seen 
a large increase in the prevalence of obesity. In the UK, where obesity has 
doubled between 1985 and 1995, the media presentation of the epidemic is 
more marked and the healthcare budget allocation is higher. In France, only 
surgical treatment is reimbursed; obesity medication is not reimbursed and 
neither are dietary or psychological treatments. This discrepancy suggests 
that instrumental arguments have won the day when it comes to targeting 
obesity and ethical arguments are, at best, a background consideration. 
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3.2 Individual Responsibility and Its Normative Limitations 
Many health conditions and the medical treatments associated with them 
are widely recognized across health systems as high-priority regardless of 
the method used to establish that priority, e.g., losing a limb or suffering 
from a debilitating genetic disorder. In most of these cases we can assume 
that establishing the presence of serious harm is relatively uncontroversial. 
However, as we saw in the case of lifestyle-related diseases, there are health 
conditions that are treated differently by different healthcare providers and 
for which prioritization is a controversial and sensitive topic. Communal 
acceptance of these conditions as worthy of targeting is patchy, and ethical 
arguments (as opposed to instrumental arguments) for provision are left 
largely unarticulated. Obesity is just such a case, along with others of the so-
called “lifestyle conditions” produced by tobacco, drug, and alcohol abuse. 
Prioritizing these conditions, and in particular, extending costly and com-
plex medication, treatment, and services to those who suffer from them, 
faces at least two well-articulated objections. The first draws on moral intui-
tions, whilst the second arises from economic calculation. 
We shall refer to the first objection as the argument from self-control. Ac-
cording to this objection, lifestyle conditions, insofar as they result from 
consumption activity (e.g., eating, smoking, drinking alcohol, or taking 
narcotics), are the primary responsibility of the patient. Where regulation 
and information about health risks is widely available and clearly indicates 
the risks associated with consumption, there is a tendency to stigmatize 
many of those who suffer from lifestyle conditions as having (avoidable) 
“bad” habits, which led to their illness. Though they may become both in-
voluntary and difficult to shed, the formation and persistence of these hab-
its can be seen as the result of a specifically moral flaw – lack of self-control 
– inherent in the individual suffering from the condition. 
The second objection draws on mainstream economics and rational 
choice social science rather than explicitly moral considerations; we refer to 
it as the argument from rationality. According to this view rational agents 
choose what they prefer and reveal their preferences through their choices. 
Thus, in a situation where adequate information about the consequences of 
consumption is available, what we interpret as harmful or “overconsump-
tion” should be seen as rational action carried out by a sovereign consumer. 
More extreme versions of this argument would then regard any attempt to 
modify behavior through intervention, regulation, or incentives as unjusti-
fied and paternalistic 
At first glance, the two positions presented above seem to adopt contradic-
tory perspectives. The moral argument implies that health outcomes are the 
consequence of irrational choices made by individuals lacking the virtue of 
self-control, whilst the economic argument sees health outcomes as the 
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consequence of rational choices made by individuals seeking to maximize 
utility. However, these prima facie differences mask an underlying similari-
ty: they both conceptualize the individual agent as an isolated consumer. That 
is, rather than taking into account the institutional context, social relations, 
and affective ties that are constitutive of real patients, individuals are seen 
principally as choosers with bundles of pre-assigned preferences. This view 
of individuals as isolated consumers then leads readily to the “liberal” con-
clusion that lifestyle conditions are problems of individual responsibility 
that should be addressed and solved by the individuals concerned. Thus, in 
the case of the argument from self-control, people who lack self-control 
should take charge of their lives by developing systems of rules and com-
mitments to overcome their weakness(es). And, in the case of the argument 
from rationality, consumers are rational and their choices reveal their pref-
erences, so their health outcomes are (in some sense) desired or at least 
deserved. In both cases, individual moral or cognitive characteristics rather 
than chance are deemed to be at the root of lifestyle conditions.  
More importantly, if one or both of these objections hold, then it is no 
longer obvious why the community as a whole should be held responsible 
for the alleged excesses of some of its (supposedly well-informed) members. 
There is empirical evidence of variation in both treatment and reimburse-
ment policies with respect to lifestyle conditions (Nguyen-Kim et al. 2005; 
Vemer et al. 2010), which might indicate sensitivity on the part of healthcare 
providers to the two arguments outlined above, though there are counter-
vailing tendencies and the link has not yet been made explicit.  
4. An Impossible Instrumental Health Strategy:  
A Clarification through Humanist Criticism 
This section criticizes the instrumental argument from a humanistic point 
of view. It insists on the social conditions of obesity that modify the moral 
argument (4.1). Our objective in section 4.2 is to use the analytical frame-
work introduced in Batifoulier, Braddock, and Latsis (2013) to articulate a 
firm moral grounding to counter instrumental justifications. We argue that 
those who suffer from lifestyle conditions are subject to serious harm, 
which justifies communal intervention on their behalf. We combine human-
istic philosophy with the framework of EC to show that the instrumental 
logic is more a process of legitimization than legitimacy (4.3). 
4.1 Obesity as Social Construction 
Social scientists have studied the mechanisms that aid the development and 
maintenance of future regarding behavior in some depth and their results 
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can readily be connected to the obesity epidemic. Discussion of the social 
determinants of obesity is widely documented in the social science litera-
ture, with a variety of complementary arguments being put forward in re-
cent years. Many scholars show how individual decisions are embedded in 
social structures and lifestyles cannot be described independently of context 
(Cockerham 2013, 2005; Cockerham and Hinote 2009; Cockerham, Rütten, 
and Abel 1997). Moreover, the self-determination and autonomy empha-
sized in the individualist paradigm have been shown to be conditioned by 
the material conditions of existence (Reilly et al. 2014). It has even been 
claimed that individual action is not dispersed among social determinants 
but embedded in the habitus (see Bourdieu 1984) through which individuals 
internalize social structures. So, for example, weight gain is not seen as a 
problem in all social classes, and is mainly a problem for the leisure class; 
the image of the “body beautiful” is differentially distributed (e.g., the social 
or professional environment can increase the pressure to be thin, for exam-
ple amongst female trainees). This is reinforced by the fact that cultural 
perceptions differ over what counts as good food: flavor for some, health for 
others (as with the preference for “organic” food): healthy eating is seen 
differently by different social groups, and lifestyle conditions are linked to 
socioeconomic class (Cockerham 2005). 
When it comes to obesity, neither healthy eating nor physical exercise is a 
product of the free choice of the individual. They rest on different levels of 
economic, social, and cultural capital, which themselves produce different 
attitudes. Educational level will affect the ability to control intake; someone 
with such “cultural capital” better understands the negative effects of large 
helpings or fatty foods, and the significance of food labelling and warnings 
(Christensen and Carpiano 2014). Moreover, food insecurity itself is a major 
cause of disorganized eating behaviors, as shown by a recent French study 
of women receiving food assistance (Vernay et al. 2014). Nutritional imbal-
ance is tied to the fear of going without, which leads to increased nutritional 
imbalance for mothers and children. 
In an influential study of consumption in the US and UK since 1950 (Offer 
2006), Avner Offer coined the term commitment technologies to describe the 
resources used by individuals to resist the pull of short-term rewards such 
as those described above. Giving the example of a student deciding whether 
to spend the evening at her desk or go out with friends, he explains how the 
decision to behave consistently with long-term interests (and stay at her 
desk) is facilitated by features of the student’s environment such as teaching 
schedules, exam timetables, and parental expectations (Offer 2006, 3). 
Commitment technologies are also implicit in several pioneering contribu-
tions to sociology. Norbert Elias (1978) and Bourdieu (1984) both analyzed 
the development of conventions of bourgeois table manners in Europe as 
increases in food production began to enable consumption beyond the min-
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imum needed for subsistence. Scholars have hypothesized that an im-
portant explanation for the existence of rules of etiquette surrounding food 
is that they are a ritualistic mechanism of self-control in an unfamiliar envi-
ronment of relative affluence. The evolution of bourgeois table manners can 
thus been seen as part of an overarching quasi-functionalist narrative, 
where commitment technologies are developed to cope with the conse-
quences of greater affluence (Offer 2006, 143).5  
It is here that Offer breaks with previous scholarship by showing how af-
fluence in the West has created a regressive social dynamic that leads to a 
decline in wellbeing. In the case of obesity, Offer cites a host of familiar 
physiological and social factors that can be used to explain increased body 
weight: availability and quality of food, breakdown of family meals, in-
creased work hours, stress and time pressure, and the reduction in manual 
jobs, to mention just a few (Offer 2006, 144-51). These conditions present 
consumers with a tempting array of high-calorie food that is both heavily 
marketed and ubiquitously available. Worse still, most people lack the nec-
essary resources to resist temptation because there is a time lag between the 
development of the productive technologies that make more and different 
types of food available, and the creation of stable and widespread commit-
ment technologies that facilitate self-control. The next step of Offer’s ac-
count is plausible though somewhat mechanistic: whichever commitment 
technologies have been constructed to counter the “obesity epidemic” (di-
ets, low-fat food, exercise regimes) are a scarce and expensive resource that 
can only be acquired by wealthier and better-educated people. In this way, 
Offer relates the speed of technological change and rising income inequality 
to the observed rapid increase in average body weight in the UK and US. He 
also provides a ready explanation for the unequal distribution of weight gain 
within populations, positing a mechanism that connects socioeconomic 
status and obesity through the mechanism of an acquired capacity to exer-
cise self-control. 
The conclusion from all of this must be that obesity is a medical condition 
with actual and potential deleterious effects on the individual’s physical and 
psychological health, and that it is above all a disease of social vulnerability. 
 
5  Work on intergenerational transmission of lifestyle conditions has confirmed Offer’s analysis. 
Studies of childhood obesity have shown how, in the absence of parental control and in the 
presence of children’s ability to negotiate, obesity is linked to the social status of the family 
(Ehmke et al. 2008). As with health inequalities in general, there is a social gradient of obesity 
in children. Intergenerational transmission of lifestyle is accompanied by obesity in the most 
vulnerable parts of the population. For example, the income of parents is the best predictor of 
childhood obesity in Spain (Costa-Font and Gil 2013). There is thus an unequal risk of becom-
ing obese since the social milieu of origin has a long-term effect on health by affecting adult 
health (Khlat, Jusot, and Ville 2009; Bricard, Jusot, and Tubeuf 2010). All these factors make 
individual decision-making highly relative to context and conditions, and justify a more con-
sistent approach to funding treatment. 
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Hence, the contribution of individual responsibility and decision-making in 
nutrition must be seen in the context of factors that are to a varying and 
often a very large extent outside the control of the individual. Social origins, 
social and economic context, and life circumstances relating to the man-
agement of nutrition must all be taken into account. 
4.2  Health as a Vital Need and the Concept of Common Ground 
We have previously argued that differential healthcare resource allocations, 
including differences in targeting and prioritization, can be explained in 
terms of the socially and psychologically constructed dimension of 
healthcare needs (Batifoulier, Braddock, and Latsis 2013). Different values 
will guide the construction of these “thick” healthcare needs and hence, 
implicitly or explicitly, inform such differentials.  
Variation in healthcare priorities across different communities is not arbi-
trary if priorities can be normatively grounded in the values of the commu-
nities that adopt them. To be legitimate, such priorities must meet two con-
ditions. First, they must possess a universal dimension grounded in general 
human concerns. We will argue that, in the case of healthcare, this univer-
sality lies in the intent to protect the community’s members from harm. 
Second, and crucially, since harm can befall any member by chance and 
through events beyond their control, priorities cannot be solely established 
by calculation of individual or group risk and responsibility. Priorities must 
be consistent with (and in principle should reflect) the community’s concep-
tion of the common good.6 
Avoiding or mitigating the harm of ill-health is the key to understanding 
the universal dimension of prioritization. In order to articulate and clarify 
this idea further, we employ David Wiggins’ concept of vital need as a need 
that must be met if serious harm to the individual is to be avoided or miti-
gated (Wiggins 2005, 1987). Our understanding of the idea of human harm is 
drawn from the thought of humanistic philosophers such as Wiggins, 
Alasdair MacIntyre, and Bernard Williams. In the human context, “serious 
harm” is the loss of agentive power: the diminution of the individual’s power 
to act in the natural and the social world in a way that is physically efficient, 
rationally effective, and within individual control. What makes the human 
being an agent is the power of active, intentional, and autonomous engage-
ment with the world and to lose this agentive power is to lose a part of what 
it is to live a human life. Construing serious harm in this way then provides 
a generalizable basis for assessing healthcare needs as vital needs: a 
 
6  Here, the notion of common good is linked to the concept of vital need. It is both different 
from and close to the notion of common good used in economies of worth. We will come back 
to this in the last part. 
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healthcare need is a vital need when meeting it will avoid, or mitigate, the 
harm of diminution or loss of a subject’s agentive power. The harm formula-
tion is also sensitive to contingent variation in the historical, material, and 
technological conditions faced by a community. It explicitly allows for the 
specification of what counts as harm in a given community to be filled in, 
both from attitudes and values expressed by its members and by reference 
to the way its social arrangements and extant communal practices offer 
protection against harm and so, embody conceptions of the common good.7 
Our emphasis on harm as the prior concept around which to organize an 
ethics of resource allocation implies important differences from the capabil-
ities approach of Sen and Nussbaum, despite the fact that something like 
our concept of agentive power can be found in the capabilities literature. 
The differences are seen both in the focus of concern and in the priorities of 
philosophical analysis. In respect of focus, both the theoretical lens and the 
practical goal of the capabilities approach are centered on the idea of free-
dom as development, and hence the analytic emphasis is on capability as 
“effective freedom,” the freedom to deploy human abilities without coer-
cion, and with means and opportunity. Furthermore, health has a second-
ary role as instrumental in achieving development goals.  
By contrast, our own focus is to develop a solid ethical basis for healthcare 
economics, including a theoretical apparatus that can recognize and 
acknowledge both the variety and the complexity of the values implicated in 
healthcare provision. Our conception of agentive power as constitutive of 
humanness is logically prior to the possession of capabilities. Harm is to be 
defined not in terms of impaired flourishing or realizing of potential but in 
terms of impaired humanity; not in terms of the possibilities for develop-
ment and freedom, but in terms of what it is to “be” a person in terms of 
one’s physical, psychological, and social agentive powers. Agentive power is 
a condition of possibility of freedom and so a condition of possibility of 
capability. 
On our interpretation of serious harm as the impairment of human agen-
cy, it is a harm that ill-health, among other causes, can bring about. 
Healthcare needs are vital when what they require will prevent the serious 
harm of becoming impaired as a fully agentive human being. By categoriz-
ing healthcare needs as vital needs, and consequently the harm that accrues 
from their not being met as serious harm to the human capacity for agency, 
we provide an ethical justification for prioritization grounded in the tradi-
 
7  This conception is close to the works that criticize the application of the biomedical model for 
which all illnesses are either mainly or exclusively a consequence of some disruption to or 
malfunction of the biological process. On the contrary, the conventionalist thesis (Da Silva 
2017, 2018), related to the Canguilhem thesis (Diaz-Bone 2021), wants to show a plurality of 
forms of representation of health and disease. 
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tion of humanistic philosophy. We also provide a workable criterion that 
can be applied case by case, individual by individual, and community by 
community to determine whether a healthcare need is for something that 
will restore, or arrest, the ongoing impairment of agency for that individual 
in that community.  
This allows us to give specific content to the definition of the common 
good as that which all members of a community must have access to in 
order to live with dignity in that community. As such, our proposal is that 
“to live with dignity” means to possess agentive power. Thus, the resources 
to protect this status are what “all members of the community must have 
access to” in order to live with dignity. So the common good at issue in 
healthcare denotes those resources which will mitigate the harm of im-
paired agentive power.  
It is important to acknowledge that in linking healthcare resource prioriti-
zation to the common good of protection from harm, we are making a 
strong claim about the nature of the values that inform priority-setting and 
about the methodology to be employed to determine these. While empirical 
studies of national differences in priorities cite differences in “societal val-
ues,” operational definitions (such as NICE’s “judgements of social value”)8 
in such empirical ethical studies cannot be values in our terms since they 
are utilitarian calculations of ideal situations. Here, as Sen points out 
(though without advocating a common good approach), when societal val-
ues are equated with utilitarian calculations of subjective preferences in-
dexed to idealized situations, they exclude both important dimensions of 
variability within communities and prior ethical considerations for that, or 
for any, community (e.g., Sen 2001). Furthermore, and importantly for our 
harm-based approach, utilitarian calculations – in common with Rawlsian 
deliberation (Wiggins 2005, 35, 38) – do not take into account the value at-
tached to what is assumed prior to calculation: that circumstances prejudi-
cial to preference formation do not obtain. Thus neither utilitarian calcula-
tion nor Rawlsian deliberation can accommodate, within the frame of 
subjective interest, the norms of reciprocity and support that realize the 
community’s values, including its ideas of the common good, by welding 
practices into a coherent social whole and make possible its way of life.  
Our position is in fact stronger than this because, on the common good 
approach that we advocate, utilitarian calculation is excluded as formally 
incompatible. A common good for a community is one the community itself 
creates and maintains through its practices, to which all its members have 
 
8  The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK, the Haute Autorité 
de Santé (HAS) in France, or the Institut für Qualität and Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesund-
heitswesen (IQWIG) in Germany provide national guidance and have sought to legitimate ra-
tioning measures by making them compatible with judgements of social value. 
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access and for whom it is only an individual good because of its commonali-
ty: a common good is neither “reducible” to nor “constructible” from indi-
vidual goods. In this conception of the common good we follow MacIntyre 
(1999), for whom a common good is mutually constituted between commu-
nity and individuals and is intended as such; it is a good about which mem-
bers of the community have a common, shared mind and purpose. Its value 
is as a good essentially and indivisibly shared; as, and only as, a good held 
by the community that is a good for each of its members. A common good 
approach excludes a utilitarian construal of societal values as formally in-
consistent since, MacIntyre points out, societal values that derive from the 
common good thus understood cannot be equated with atomized subjective 
interests. 
4.3 Is it Sustainable to Justify the Treatment of Obesity Based on 
Market Logic? 
As we have seen, the two types of justification for health policies on obesity 
can be opposed. On the one hand, there is an approach that borrows from 
market logic and advocates patient management based on individual re-
sponsibility. On the other hand, there is a humanistic and critical approach 
that considers care as non-negotiable and is based on collective manage-
ment of patients taking into account their vital needs. 
These two approaches might be thought to be complementary through 
sharing a legitimate common objective (the improvement of the health 
status of individuals) even while differing greatly in the means to achieve it. 
They might also seem to be linked together, because market logic will ap-
pear to accommodate some of the criticism it invites from the humanistic 
approach. In this last section, our objective will therefore be to show that 
market logic, confronted with humanistic principles, is forced to adapt itself 
in order to resist the latter’s criticism. To do so, it lays claim to principles of 
legitimacy intended to validate the market regime’s axiomatic structure 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), which our immanent critique shows to be no 
more than legitimizing principles to which it is not entitled. 
Market logic was developed with the neo-liberal turn of the 1980s: it is 
budgetary constraint that highlights the imperative of individual responsi-
bility. Health is considered as a capital that must be maintained or made to 
bear fruit in the same way as financial capital. This situation leads to a para-
dox: although the market concept of health is the subject of much criticism, 
it is in constant development (Batifoulier 2014; Batifoulier and Domin 2015). 
We formulate the hypothesis that if the market conception resists criticism, 
it is precisely because it manages to present itself in the register of market 
justification described by Boltanski and Thévenot. Instrumental policy is 
based on the budgetary savings it would allow. However, it also needs moral 
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justification. It then rehabilitates itself by taking over the arguments of 
legitimacy from the axiomatic of worth (cité). 
As we have seen above, the process of justification in conventionalist 
analysis is based on the model of economies of worth. The “worth” (cité) 
model of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) provides an analytical framework, 
resting on the main modern Western political philosophies, which enumer-
ates the shared higher principles on which individuals’ justifications are 
based. These principles are considered legitimate insofar as they respect six 
axioms that guarantee both a principle of equivalence between them and a 
general scope. 
Instrumental health policy seems, at least on the surface, to respect this 
axiomatic structure. The axiom of common humanity (a1) is respected in the 
sense that men, who cannot be the object of commercial exchange, all have 
the same right to health even if they are considered to cause their own pa-
thology because of their individual behavior. The principle of dissimilarity 
(a2) can be interpreted as the taking into account of differences in initial 
state of health justifying, where appropriate, different forms of treatment: 
individual responsibility for some, collective benevolence for others. The 
principle of common dignity (a3) can be translated as the fact that a person 
can improve his or her health capital, which gives them “an identical power 
of access to all states.” The principle of magnitude (a4) associates each state to 
a scale of values. Here it goes without saying that being healthy is a high-
ranking state while poor health will be rated as low-ranking. The investment 
formula (a5) is respected in the sense that the good health of high-ranking 
people is linked to investment, effort, and individual responsibility. Finally, 
the common good (a6) is understood as the principle that the wellbeing of the 
“worthy” must benefit the “unworthy,” in particular the low-ranking (those 
in poor health) insofar as, through their wise management, they will make 
less demands on collective health expenditure and will therefore reduce the 
pressure of budgetary constraints on the determination of health policies. 
This exercise suggests that the axiomatic applied to health through the 
market prism can be respected. However, several internal contradictions 
undermine this conclusion. 
First with respect to a1, it should be noted that individual responsibility 
and the axiom of common humanity are in tension; if the requirement for 
individual responsibility justifies the absence of care during the lifetime of a 
part of the population because of their individual behavior, we find never-
theless that when the ultimate consequence of the disease appears, this 
same individual responsibility no longer applies. In other words, the theme 
of responsibility weighs on the management of obesity and lifestyle-related 
pathologies but is cancelled once the disease becomes serious and life 
threatening. Thus, you will not be reimbursed for treating your obesity 
because it is your fault. But the amputation and fitting of a prosthetic leg 
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that you are going to undergo because of the diabetes triggered by your 
obesity will be reimbursed even though the cause is supposed to be your 
responsibility. This attitude to therapeutic intervention is indispensable if 
we respect the principle of common humanity, which cannot leave people 
to die from a failure of individual responsibility. However, if one follows the 
standard economic theory and instrumental approach that insist on individ-
ual responsibility, one should let these people die. We should do so all the 
more since the cost of health care is concentrated at the end of life or at the 
time of critical episodes in life. Thus, if we consider the ultimate conse-
quences of illness, the prospect of budget savings is socially unsustainable 
because it implies letting fellow human beings die. 
We may ask why it is impossible to disobey the taboo of death when it 
would be rational to do so (Tirole 2013). The sacredness, and the social cen-
trality of health, are undeniable in contemporary Western societies. This 
implies that instrumental logic is not only based on an economic objective 
of reducing public expenditure, but is permeable to principles of justice that 
are indispensable when dealing with health issues, which is a primary natu-
ral good in Rawls’ terminology. This is why the principle of individual re-
sponsibility cannot be consistently applied. It is only by renouncing the 
implementation of its own principles that individual responsibility can, by 
taking care not to offend the principle of common humanity, hope to resist 
criticism and thus to persist in appearing as a justificatory principle. 
A similar inconsistency is evident with respect to a3, where the principle 
of common dignity is respected only in appearance and at the expense of an 
obvious distortion. Even while accepting that the most vulnerable benefit 
both from the advantages of individual responsibility and from the man-
agement of their pathology through collective resources, it is by no means 
certain that this will enable them to attain high-ranking status. Health states 
do not only depend on individual practices but also on social factors and 
unavoidable contingencies. Just as there is type 1 diabetes, which is an auto-
immune disease, it is now accepted that obesity can have hereditary and/or 
genetic foundations, as well as the socioeconomic determinants we have 
foregrounded. Because a number of these pathologies are incurable or una-
voidable, the principle of common dignity is limited by the fact that there is 
no such thing as “identical power of access” to health itself.  
Thirdly, both the principle of dissimilarity (a2) and the principle of com-
mon good (a6) are in tension with the existence of a “responsibility trap” as 
a harmful effect of a health market policy in which insistence on individual 
responsibility carries moral weight. If an individual pays attention to his or 
her lifestyle, it improves health and frees up resources for others. On the 
other hand, if the individual does not do so and his or her health is poor, the 
blame lies with the individual. Many current public health policies implicit-
ly concur with this argument, and reimburse little or nothing as compensa-
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tion for these diseases. In this context, following the market logic is tanta-
mount to placing the blame on the sick themselves. This is a dubious con-
ception of legitimacy in any case. It is certainly one that contradicts the 
principle of dissimilarity which requires accepting the otherness of all peo-
ple regardless of their initial state of health and individual capacities. It is 
also incompatible with the principle of the common good, in “blaming” the 
lesser-ranked and shifting responsibility away from the collective.  
It is not only, then, that in the field of health the logic of budgetary con-
straint cannot by itself be a sufficient justification. Our critique shows that 
the logic of individual responsibility, while it mobilizes the grammar of 
market justification, does not sit at all well in a regime of justification even 
when, under the pressure of humanist logic, it adopts the regime’s argu-
ments of legitimacy in order to deflect criticism.  
It is the notion of vital need which allows us to move away from this situa-
tion. Recognizing health as a vital need means that it is no longer simply a 
form of capital to be made to bear fruit. While social inequalities in econom-
ic wealth can potentially be overcome by the accumulation of wealth, those 
related to health can never be overcome. Health does not accumulate, at 
best, it is preserved. Thus, an inequality of birth or position acquired at a 
given point in life because of an accident or lack of care can hardly be made 
up for. Poor health influences all spheres of economic and social life. 
The rise in inequalities with neoliberalism, and the contribution of social 
scientific work showing the existence of a social gradient in health states, 
for example in the case of obesity (Darmon 2008), underlines how the mar-
ket logic, applied to health, fails to constitute a “worth” (cité). At the same 
time, as various conventionalist studies have shown, the stability of a con-
vention can go hand in hand with the maintenance of a certain level of ine-
quality, or even injustice. Work on the concept of “bad convention” (Lar-
quier and Batifoulier 2005; Batifoulier 2015; Larquier 2016) highlights the 
fact that certain conceptions or ideas acquire conventional status even 
though they are denounced because of their inefficiency or unfairness. 
Similarly, discriminatory practices may be fundamentally unjust but persist 
(Ghirardello 2019). 
In health, the argument of individual responsibility, which underlies the 
market orientation of health policies, has been adept at incorporating criti-
cism in order to endure. This makes it possible to understand why the mar-
ket logic remains when it allows social inequalities to persist. But this logic’s 
force is owed to transactions of legitimization, not to principles of legitima-
cy guaranteed by conventions. 
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5. Conclusion 
Lifestyle conditions are clearly harmful in the sense that they impair human 
agency in significant ways. The physiological aspects of harm in the case of 
obesity, alcoholism, or tobacco addiction are well known, and the physical 
and psychological handicaps that they impose clearly impinge upon agen-
tive powers. But lifestyle conditions also lead to harm in a broader sociolog-
ical sense which goes beyond the medical definition of disease. Empirical 
patterns do not establish a causal link, but they do emphasize the remarka-
ble array of status-related problems that obese individuals face in reality 
and show correlations between obesity and reduced professional and mari-
tal opportunities, lower income, and a number of other socioeconomic 
issues (Offer 2006).  
We have identified two approaches to giving priority to living conditions. 
These two approaches are shared references that can be called conventions, 
according to the theoretical framework of EC. The two registers of justifica-
tion are in competition.  
To prioritizing lifestyle conditions, the first approach is instrumental. This 
approach views the patient as an isolated consumer who is responsible for 
her own medical predicament. Prioritizing the needs of such a patient can 
nevertheless be justified, but the justification is the direct result of a utilitar-
ian cost calculation. Policy measures are introduced because they are con-
sistent with the market-oriented healthcare reform of recent years (Mooney 
2012) and, more specifically, because they are deemed to be less expensive 
and more efficient than the alternative of treating the longer term effects of 
lifestyle conditions. This may explain why several European healthcare 
authorities have targeted lifestyle conditions like tobacco use and obesity, 
often at great cost to publicly funded health budgets. 
In contrast, the second approach is not motivated by instrumental consid-
erations. Instead, it seeks to articulate an ethical case for prioritizing life-
style conditions. On the premise that ill-health, and the harm it brings, are a 
result of chance for the individual, one such chance is the physical and 
social environment in which the individual is born and raised, including the 
incident of birth itself. Another is the individual’s physical and psychologi-
cal endowment. The opportunities for developing and using these are then 
contingencies which are path-dependent with respect to social, political, 
and economic factors which are themselves largely beyond the individual’s 
control. If it is opportunity that brings about ill-health and ill-health is, as we 
argue, a form of harm (specifically the harm that comes from vitiation of 
agentive power), then the role of social justice is to guard against this. Tar-
geting is justified because it realizes the common good of protection from 
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such harm visited on individuals as a matter of chance, and helps preserve 
their agentive status. 
However, these two registers of justification are not on the same level. As 
we have shown, health is not just a capital that the individual is responsible 
for. Even if this point of view is present in social health policy, it goes hand 
in hand with the development of major inequalities, of which obesity pro-
vides an emblematic case study. 
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